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ATHLETES
On June 11, 1979, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
in Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.' that a professional football
player does not necessarily assume all risks of personal injury merely
by participating in the game.2 The lower court,3 in holding to the con-
trary, had concluded that "NFL rules of play are so legalistic. . .[and
the game is so fast] that the differences between violations which could
fairly be called deliberate, reckless or outrageous and those which are
'fair play' would be so small and subjective as to be incapable of articu-
lation."4 From this analysis, the district court had determined that it
should not hear the case. The court of appeals reversed the district
court decision5 and remanded the case for trial.6
Ten weeks later, a jury in a federal district court awarded Houston
Rockets professional basketball player Rudy Tomjanovich $3.25 mil-
lion7 in his suit against the Los Angeles Lakers for injuries he suffered
1. 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
2. 601 F.2d at 520-21. The court rejected the view that the football field is "like a battlefield
where the restraints of civilization have been left on the sidelines." Id. at 520.
3. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352, 356 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601
F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cer. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979).
4. 435 F. Supp. at 358. As a matter of social policy the district court ruled that professional
football is an area best left to the supervision of the legislature. It analogized the hazards of
professional football to those inherent in coal mining and railroading, and suggested that legisla-
tion along the lines of the Federal Coal Mining Safety Act and the Federal Employers' Liability
Act would be the most appropriate way to handle tort liability in professional football. Id. at 357.
The court noted that the commercial nature of the game made professional football a particularly
"dense thicket," with which the courts should avoid entanglement. Id. at 358.
5. 601 F.2d at 524.
6. The appellees filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court seeking review of the
circuit court's decision that there was jurisdiction over the case. Certiorari was denied, 441 U.S.
931 (1979).
7. Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc., No. 78-243 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 1979), appealdock.
eted, No. 79-3889 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 1979). The jury awarded $21,376 for past medical expenses;
$200,000 for future medical expenses; $100,000 for past physical pain; $100,000 for future physical
pain; $200,000 for past mental anguish; $75,000 for future mental anguish; $150,000 for loss of
earnings (even though Tomjanovich received his salary while injured); $850,000 for loss of future
earning capacity; $50,000 for his wife's loss of comfort (she was also a plaintiff in the action); and
$1,500,000 for punitive damages. The total award exceeded by $600,000 the amount sought by
Tomjanovich. THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Sept. 3, 1979, at 13, col. 3.
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when a Lakers employee, Kermit Washington, struck him in the face
during a game.8 The Tomjanovich case was the first successful civil
damages action ever brought by a professional athlete against an oppo-
nent or an opposing team.
Decided within several months of each other, the Tomjanovich and
Hackbart cases may indicate a new, activist trend by the judiciary in
the area of professional sports. This Comment will examine these two
cases, particularly Hackbart, to determine whether this trend represents
a radical departure from prior law, or is simply an incremental step in a
changing area of law. The Comment will begin by examining the as-
sumption of risk defense to determine why this traditional bar to recov-
ery for sports injuries9 no longer defeats a cause of action for such
injuries as a matter of law. The first section will also analyze the his-
tory of both the assumption of risk defense and tort litigation in sports.
The following section will discuss whether a team should be held liable
for the tortious conduct of its employees. This issue raises a perplexing
question: if a plaintiff has not assumed the risks which led to his injury
because the defendant's actions are outside the scope of the rules and
customs of the game, can the defendant's tortious conduct still be
within the scope of his employment'0 so that his employer will be lia-
ble?
I. VIOLENCE IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
A. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc."
On September 16, 1973, the Cincinnati Bengals and the Denver
Broncos played a football game in Denver, Colorado. With the score
at 21 to 3 in Denver's favor, the Broncos intercepted a Cincinnati pass.
Bengals running back "Booby" Clark, "acting out of anger and frustra-
tion, but without a specific intent to injure,"'12 reacted by delivering a
forearm blow to the back of Bronco's defensive back Dale Hackbart's
neck. No penalty was called, and no altercation ensued. Hackbart sub-
sequently suffered some pain but continued playing for two more
weeks, after which the team released him. Hackbart eventually sought
medical attention, and his injury was diagnosed as a fractured neck.' 3
8. Washington was not made a party to the suit.
9. See notes 25-34 infra and accompanying text.
10. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
11. 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
12. 435 F. Supp. at 353. Clark testified that he was frustrated because the Bengals were
losing the game. 601 F.2d at 519.
13. Federal District Judge Richard Matsch, sitting without a jury, found these to be the facts.
They appear never to have been controverted. No referee saw Clark deliver the blow, but game
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Hackbart then instituted an action against the Cincinnati Bengals and
Clark.
The Colorado district court held that Hackbart had assumed the
risk14 of his injury and could not maintain an action:
Upon all of the evidence, my finding is that the level of violence and
the frequency of emotional outbursts in NFL football games are such
that Dale Hackbart must have recognized and accepted the risk that
he would be injured by such an act as that committed by the defend-
ant Clark .... 15
The district court also analyzed the problem from a duty-of-care per-
spective, and rejected the notion that a professional football player
owes a duty of care to an opponent. t6 Thus, relying upon assumption-
of-risk and duty-of-care analyses, the court concluded that Clark was
not liable for his conduct; even if he did owe Hackbart a duty to con-
duct himself in a reasonable manner, Hackbart assumed the risk that
he would not do So. t7
Having established the defendants' nonliability,18 the district court
went on to reject judicial interference in professional football gener-
ally.'9 It is unclear why the court felt obligated to discuss the social
policy underlying the inapplicability of traditional tort principles to
professional football.20 Since the court had already rejected the plain-
tiff's claim, enunciating a judicial policy of nonintervention was unnec-
essary to the decision. Not surprisingly, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit unambiguously rejected this approach. 2t
films clearly show the incident. 601 F.2d at 519. The Broncos intercepted a Bengals pass, and
Hackbart attempted to block Clark to prevent Clark from tackling his teammate. Hackbart fell to
the ground and Clark hit him from behind.
14. For a general discussion of assumption of risk, see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 68 (4th
ed. 1971).
15. 435 F. Supp. at 356. The court heard testimony of former football players condemning
the incident as outside the customs of the game, 601 F.2d at 521, but did not view this evidence as
dispositive.
16. 435 F. Supp. at 356. The court emphasized the violent nature of the game, and stated:
It is wholly incongruous to talk about a professional football player's duty of care for the
safety of opposing players when he has been trained and motivated to be heedless of
injury to himself. The character of NFL competition negates any notion that the playing
conduct can be circumscribed by any standard of reasonableness.
d.
17. Id.
18. Naturally, the Bengals could not be liable as Clark's employer if Clark himself was not.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217A (1958); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 99(3)
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
19. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
20. 435 F. Supp. at 357.
21. The court stated:
The [district] judge also pointed out that courts are ill-suited to decide the different social
questions and to administer conflicts on what is much like a battlefield where the re-
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B. Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc. 22
The Tomjanovich case arose out of an altercation between Kevin
Kunnert of professional basketball's Houston Rockets and Kermit
Washington of the Los Angeles Lakers. Tomjanovich, a Houston
player, attempted to break up the fight. Washington, seeing this oppo-
nent approaching rapidly, and not aware of his purpose, turned and hit
Tomjanovich. The blow fractured Tomjanovich's face and skull, broke
his nose, separated his upper jaw, and caused a cerebral concussion.
Washington was fined $10,000 and was suspended for at least sixty
days-the stiffest punishment ever imposed by National Basketball As-
sociation Commissioner Larry O'Brien. Several teammates reportedly
were unhappy with the severity of the penalty. They sympathized with
Washington's reflex action at seeing a perceived enemy approaching,
and noted that Washington was not considered a "dirty" player.23
Violence in professional sports is not a new phenomenon. The
Tomjanovich and Hackbart cases, however, were attempts to find a
new answer to this old problem. Injured by acts of violence, Tomja-
novich and Hackbart sought judicial relief. That they pursued such a
course was in itself historic; that Tomjanovich actually won24 prompts
an examination of the doctrine of assumption of risk-which for so
long precluded such victories-and of its demise.
II. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
A. Eary History.
The defense of assumption of risk25 traditionally has prevented
plaintiffs from succeeding in suits for sports injuries when they con-
straints of civilization have been left on the sidelines.
We are forced to conclude that the result reached [by the district court] is not sup-
ported by evidence.
601 F.2d at 520.
It is difficult to understand why social policy should dictate judicial blindness to the violence
of professional football. The threat of proper judicial intervention can serve the useful function of
discouraging uncontrolled and unnecessary violence. To say that there will be many cases which
are best decided on the field rather than in the courtroom is not to say that the occasional blatant
violation of both the regulations of the league and the laws of the states should not be heard by the
judiciary.
22. No. 78-243 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-3889 (5th Cir. Dec. 3,
1979).
23. Kirkpatrick, Shattered and Shaken, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 2, 1978, at 47. For a brief
account of the trial see notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
24. A final decision has not yet been reached in the Hackbart case.
25. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C (1965) defines assumption of risk thus:
(1). .. a plaintiff who fully understands a risk of harm to himself... caused by the
defendant's conduct. . ., and who nevertheless voluntarily chooses to enter or remain
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sented 26 to participating in competition. One of the first cases to bar a
plaintiff's action because he was held to have assumed the risk of hisinjury was Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.27 In Murphy, the
plaintiff was charged with the knowledge that people frequently fell
while on the particular amusement park attraction on which he was
injured. The court noted that "[o]ne who takes part in such a sport
accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious and
necessary .... -28 That the plaintiff's fall led to an unusually severe
injury was immaterial because the assumption of the risk of the fall
itself barred the action. Interestingly, the court also suggested that the
defendant was not negligent. The amusement attraction was not found
to have hidden defects, or to have been running irregularly.29 If the
defendant was not negligent, however, he could not be found liable
even if the plaintiff had not assumed any risks. Thus, although Murphy
is often cited as an example of the operation of an assumption of risk
defense, the case may also have been decided on the ground that the
defendant was nonnegligent because he did not violate any duty of care
owed to the plaintiff. Of course, a reasonable interpretation of the
court's use of both the assumption of risk and the duty of care princi-
ples is that the defendant was nonnegligent because of the plaintiff's
assumption of risk. That is, the defendant's duty of care was reduced to
the extent that the plaintiff assumed certain risks. This would inversely
relate negligence and assumption of risk on a continuum-the more
risk assumed, the less care owed. Whether the Murphy court relied on
this reasoning is unclear.
A comparison of Murphy with the New York case of Tantillo v.
Goldstein Bros. Amusement Co. ,3 decided one year earlier, suggests the
limited extent to which the Murphy court may have relied on the as-
sumption of risk doctrine. In Murphy, Chief Judge Cardozo dist-
...within the area of that risk, under circumstances that manifest his willingness to
accept it, is not entitled to recover for harm within that risk.
The key elements are knowledge, and voluntary assumption, of the risk. See id. §§ 496A, 496D,
and 496E. For an early elucidation of the doctrine, see Bohlen, Voluntary Assumtipion of Risk. 20
HARV. L. REv. 14 (1906). See also Symposium.: Assumption a/Risk, 22 LA. L. REv. 1 (1961).
26. Consent has been defined as a "willingness in fact for conduct to occur." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 (1965). An early case barring the plaintiff from recovery is McAdams
v. Windham, 208 Ala. 492, 94 So. 742 (1922), in which a friendly boxing match resulted in the
death of one of the participants. The court held that the deadly blow had been consented to and
was therefore not actionable. Id. at 493, 94 So. at 743.
27. 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173 (1929).
28. Id. at 482, 166 N.E. at 174.
29. Id.
30. 248 N.Y. 286, 162 N.E. 82 (1928). The plaintiff, a minor, was admitted without charge to
a vaudeville show and induced to participate in one of the acts. Because of the troupe's negli-
gence, the plaintiff's arm was broken.
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inguished Tantillo as a case in which the risks were "obscure or
unobserved,"'3' and therefore not assumed. The Tantillo court held
that the plaintiffs, though voluntary participants, were entitled to be
protected from dangers inherent in a vaudeville act. The court did not,
however, decide whether these dangers were "obvious" or "obscure. '32
The issue of assumption of risk, seemingly a relevant defense in the
case, was never raised. In Tantillo, even though the plaintiff volunta-
rily participated in the vaudeville act, the defendant's duty of care was
not reduced. When the defendant violated his duty, he was liable. The
assumption of risk defense was therefore of uncertain utility: the court
decided Tantillo without reference to that defense, and a pure negli-
gence analysis, ignoring assumption of risk, could have decided Mur-
phy as well.
In McLeod Stores v. Vinson, 33 however, a Kentucky court left no
doubt that it relied on the assumption of risk defense as a bar to a
plaintiff's recovery. Vinson had sued McLeod Stores for injuries sus-
tained during his voluntary participation in a contest the store held on
a public street. The court distinguished between the duty of care owed
by the store to Vinson as a participant, and that owed to a mere pass-
erby. The latter was entitled to protection from risks inherent in the
contest. Vinson, on the other hand, had assumed such risks by partici-
pating and hence was not entitled to the same protection.3 4 Whether
the store was negligent in running its contest was of no significance. In
essence, the court held that Vinson waived some of the store's negli-
gence when he entered the contest: "Assumption of risk is in effect a
waiver of defects and dangers . . . . 35 This case, then, more clearly
than the New York cases of Murphy and Tantillo, presents an assump-
tion of risk analysis that bars participants from recovering for personal
injuries caused by dangers obvious and inherent in an activity. It dem-
onstrates more precisely that the duty of care a defendant owes is re-
lated to the risks a plaintiff assumes.
31. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. at 483, 166 N.E. at 174.
32. 248 N.Y. at 288, 162 N.E. at 83. This case served as the basis for Judge O'Brien's dissent
in Murphy. 250 N.Y. at 484, 166 N.E. at 175.
33. 213 Ky. 667, 281 S.W. 799 (1926).
34. The court held that "in entering the race [Vinson] assumed the ordinary risks incident
thereto and is thereby barred of recovery in this action." Id. at 670, 281 S.W. at 800.
35. Id. at 669, 281 S.W. at 800 (quoting Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. Goldston, 156 Ky.
410, 161 S.W. 246 (1913)). Perhaps the best way to approach this topic is to say that assumption of
risk, in its simplest form, reduces but does not eliminate a defendant's duty of care. When the
reduced duty is violated, the defendant will be liable in the absence of other defenses. Assumption
of risk determines when some degree of care less than the degree normally owed is nonetheless
sufficient to bar liability. Tavernier v. Maes, 242 Cal. App. 2d 532, 545, 51 Cal. Rptr. 575, 583
(1966).
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McLeod Stores, however, is not in line with most of the other early
cases in the sports and games area.3 6 Rather, Murphy and Tantiflo,
with their confused analyses of assumption of risk and duty of care,
better represent this period. Judicial confusion has led to imprecision
in legal commentary. One writer,37 for example, has cited the case of
Toohey v. Webster38 for the proposition that "courts addressing tort
liability in athletic contests have recognized the existence of both con-
tributory negligence and assumption of the risk as appropriate de-
fenses."' 39 Yet in Toohey, the court held for the plaintiff, stating that
the defendant had a duty of care to warn the plaintiff of the risk in-
volved. The court flatly rejected the defense of assumption of risk,
"having already decided that it was the duty of the defendant to give
audible and timely warning .. ".. ,40 The court refused to recognize
the assumption of risk defense in cases in which the defendant is negli-
gent; when the defendant is not negligent the defense is, of course, un-
necessary. Unlike McLeod, Toohey did not distinguish between
individuals who had and had not assumed certain risks, apparently de-
ciding that the risk of a defendant's negligence cannot be assumed by a
plaintiff and hence is always actionable. The court did not even con-
sider whether a defendant's duty of care can be reduced by any as-
sumption of risk.
The early cases thus demonstrate the various approaches courts
have taken in applying the assumption of risk defense. While some
courts have used the defense to reduce the duty of care owed,41 other
courts have determined the defendant's liability by a simple negligence
analysis without regard to the defense of assumption of risk.4 2 This
confusion is not surprising. Indeed, many commentators argue that as-
sumption of risk is a defense without a purpose, an obfuscation best left
out of the law of torts.43 Their argument generally divides assumption
36. For a general treatment of liability for sports injuries see J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE
LAW OF SPORTS ch. 8 (1979). For a collection of both early and more recent assumption of risk
cases see id. 935 n.24. See also McAdams v. Windham, 208 Ala. 492, 94 So. 742 (1922); Freedman
v. Hurwitz, 116 Conn. 283, 164 A. 647 (1933); Goldstein v. United Amusement Corp., 86 N.H.
402, 169 A. 587 (1933); Thomas v. Barlow, 5 N.J. Misc. 764, 138 A. 208 (1927).
37. 12 GA. L. REV. 380 (1978).
38. 97 N.J.L. 545, 117 A. 838 (1922). The plaintiff, a minor, was a caddy on a golf course
when injured by a ball hit from an adjacent fairway. The golfer was in the rough and had to hit
over the green near which the plaintiff was rightfully standing.
39. 12 GA. L. REv. 380, 384 n.18 (1978).
40. 97 N.J.L. at 549, 117 A. at 839.
41. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
42. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
43. See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS ch. XXI (1956); Bohlen, supra
note 25; James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968). But see W.
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of risk cases into two categories: (1) those in which the plaintiff reason-
ably assumed the risk, and (2) those in which the plaintiff unreasonably
assumed the risk. Proponents of abolishing the defense argue that the
first category can simply be subsumed under a duty of care analysis,
and that the second category involves nothing more than contributory
negligence. 4 Although eliminating the use of the phrase "assumption
of risk" would help alleviate the confusion generated by cases such as
Murphy, Tantillo, and Toohey, it would not completely solve the prob-
lem. For example, cases in which the parties explicitly agree upon the
assumption of risk do not fit into either of the two groups. The phrase
would still be needed, therefore, albeit in a more limited role. Profes-
sor John Wade, former dean of Vanderbilt University School of Law,
finds further fault with abolishing the defense: recognizing the
problems inherent in the use of "assumption of risk," he contends that
the phrase nevertheless has certain advantages-principally "forensic
and administrative. '45 Wade argues that the defense gives a court
greater flexibility in negligence cases, and generally does not force the
court to reach a "wrong" conclusion.46
The first scholarly writing on assumption of risk expresses doubt
about the validity of that defense as a separate doctrine. In his seminal
article, Professor Francis H. Bohlen apparently argued that assumption
of risk is merely another way of discussing duty of care.47 This is most
evident in his interpretation of Priestly v. Powler,48 generally cited as
the first assumption of risk case. Bohlen viewed the case wholly from a
duty of care perspective. 49 The plaintiff servant in Priestly was denied
PROSSER, supra note 14, at 454-57; Wade, The Place of Assumption o/Risk in the Law of Negli-
gence, 22 LA. L. REV. 5, 14-15 (1961).
44. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 43, at 1162.
45. Wade, supra note 43, at 14.
46. -Id. James maintains that Wade disagrees with his view of assumption of risk. James,
Assumption o/Risk, supra note 43, at 185 n.3. The gulf between them, however, is not very wide.
Wade freely acknowledges the disadvantages of the phrase and admits that "[a]ccurate analysis
... would probably be advanced if the term [assumption of risk] were eradicated. ... Wade,
supra note 43, at 14. The difference is that James urges that the phrase be eliminated while Wade
recognizes its deeply rooted attachment to the law and the unlikelihood of its demise.
47. Bohlen, supra note 25, at 18. Although James interprets Bohlen in this manner, his rea-
soning is unclear. James, Assumption ofRisk, supra note 43, at 185-86. While Bohlen claims that
contributory negligence and assumption of risk can be viewed as distinct concepts, their merger is,
in the typical case, inevitable under his analysis. Bohlen, supra note 25, at 18.
48. 3 M & W 1 (1837). See Bohlen, supra note 25, at 27 for a discussion of this case.
49. Bohlen served as reporter for the first RESTATEMENT OF TORTS. During his tenure, the
RESTATEMENT did not include a separate defense of assumption of risk. Section 893 of the RE-
STATEMENT, which does establish a separate defense, was introduced only after Bohlen left his
position. See Wade, supra note 43, at 6. Wade believes that Bohlen, when writing his article,
believed that assumption of risk warranted a separate defense but changed his mind before be-
coming Restatement Reporter. Id. James, on the other hand, believes that Bohien was consist-
Vol. 1980:742]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
recovery from his employer because the employer did not owe a duty to
the servant greater than the duty owed by the servant to himself 50 The
first assumption of risk article, discussing the first assumption of risk
case, thus relied heavily on a duty of care analysis.5 t Confusion over
the application and utility of a separate assumption of risk analysis is a
natural legacy of this beginning.5 2
B. Recent History.
Out of this confusion the Restatement (Second) of Torts developed
a formalized definition of assumption of risk.5 3 The Restatement takes
the position that plaintiffs who knowingly54 and voluntarily55 enter into
ently opposed to any separate assumption of risk "doctrine." James, Assumption of Risk, supra
note 43, at 185 n.3.
50. A similar philosophy was expressed in Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502, 507
(1871) (Allen, J., dissenting).
51. If the plaintiff is willing to subject himself to certain risks, the defendant should not be
liable for exposing the plaintiff to those risks. This is what is meant by stating that the defendant
does not owe the plaintiff a higher standard of care than the plaintiff owes himself. Accordingly,
the plaintiff who has assumed a risk is owed a lesser duty of care than one who has not. This
approach gives some credence to the criticism leveled at the assumption of risk defense: it is so
closely tied to duty of care that it cannot be treated separately.
52. See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra. The confusion may be alleviated by noting
that assumption of risk problems arise in two situations: first, where the plaintiff acts before the
defendant, and second, where the plaintiff acts after the defendant. It is in the second category
that the breach of duty and assumption of risk theories become entangled, for while the defend-
ant's act may be a breach of duty, the plaintiff may assume the risks presented by the breach and
be barred from recovery. Those who attack the doctrine argue that whereas the plaintiff's actions
in assuming the risk may be reasonable, and therefore not contributorily negligent, a defendant
found to be negligent for having breached what would normally be his duty can avoid liability
with an assumption of risk defense. If the duty of care analysis is used, however, a more equitable
decision will be reached. See Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REv. 17,
21-22, 63 (1961).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §§ 496A-496E (1965). Section 496A defines the de-
fense: "A plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless
conduct of the defendant cannot recover for such harm."
54. Section 496C provides:
Implied Assumption of Risk.
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), a plaintiff who fully understands a risk of harm to
himself or his things caused by the defendant's conduct or by the condition of the de-
fendant's land or chattels, and who nevertheless voluntarily chooses to enter or remain,
or to permit his things to enter or remain within the area of that risk, under circum-
stances that manifest his willingness to accept it, is not entitled to recover for harm
within that risk.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) does not apply in any situation in which an express
agreement to accept the risk would be invalid as contrary to public policy.
Id. § 496c.
55. Section 496E provides:
Necessity of Voluntary Assumption.
(I) A plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm unless he voluntarily accepts the risk.
[Vol. 1980:742
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an area of risk should not recover for injuries sustained because of that
risk.56 Mere knowledge of the risk is not sufficient under the Restate-
ment. The plaintiff must "appreciate the danger itself and the nature,
character, and extent which makes it unreasonable, '57 and assume the
risk voluntarily.58 In other words, the plaintiff must voluntarily take
his chances of injury, and if he is injured because of the particular risks
of which he was actually aware, he cannot recover. The Restatement
thus distinguishes the defense of contributory negligence, which relies
on a reasonable man standard (an objective standard)59 from the as-
sumption of risk defense, which employs a subjective standard.60
Of particular importance in Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. 61
is the notion that to be barred from recovery, the plaintiff must have
assumed the specific risks that led to his injury. In each case the
chances the plaintiff was willing to take must be compared with the
injury sustained to determine whether that injury is within the area of
assumed risk.
Skating injuries present a good example of the specificity require-
ment. In Moe v. Steenberg,62 the plaintiff, while ice skating, collided
with the defendant, who had been skating backwards. In affirming a
verdict for the defendant based on an assumption of risk defense, the
court held, "It is the general rule that one who participates in a sport
assumes the risks which are inherent in it, and it is ordinarily for the
(2) The plaintiffs acceptance of a risk is not voluntary if the defendant's tortious conduct
has left him no reasonable alternative course of conduct in order to
(a) avert harm to himself or another, or
(b) exercise or protect a right or privilege of which the defendant has no right to
deprive him.
Id. § 496E.
56. See note 53 supra.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D, comment b (1965). Section 496D provides:
Knowledge and Appreciaton of Risk.
Except where he expressly so agrees, a plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm arising
from the defendant's conduct unless he then knows of the existence of the risk and ap-
preciates its unreasonable character.
58. Id. Section 496E states: "A plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm unless he voluntarily
accepts the risk." Knowledge and willingness have always been required as elements of the de-
fense. See Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q.B.D. 685 (1887): "The maxim, be it observed, is not
'scienti non fit injuria,' but 'volenti.' It is plain that mere knowledge [of the risk] may not be a
conclusive defense." Id. at 696. The defendant must prove the willingness of the plaintiff as well.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 289-290, 464 (1965). See Maxey v. Freightliner
Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 961 (N.D. Tex. 1978); McGowan v. St. Regis Paper Co., 419 F. Supp.
742, 746 (S.D. Miss. 1976).
60. Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. at 961; McGowan v. St. Regis Paper Co., 419
F. Supp at 746. See Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238, 247,45 N.W.2d 395, 400 (1950); Landrum
v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 944-47, 12 N.W.2d 82, 88-89 (1943).
61. 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
62. 275 Minn. 448, 147 N.W.2d 587 (1966).
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jury to determine what those risks are."' 63 In this case, the jury deter-
mined that an inexperienced skater could expect to fall occasionally
and hence assumed the risk that other skaters, especially one skating
backwards, might trip over him.64 In a somewhat similar case, Schamel
v. St. LouisArena Corp. ,65 however, the court reached a different result.
In Schamel, the plaintiff was hit by a person whose skating violated
rink rules. The court affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff,66 emphasizing
that the other skater's violation of the rules had continued long enough
for the rink guard and management to have stopped him. The court
expressly rejected an assumption of risk defense.67
The collisions in these two cases were similar, but the holdings are
different. One explanation for this difference may be that in Schamel,
unlike Steenberg, the plaintiff sued the rink proprietor, and not another
skater. A jury may have been less hesitant to hold the arena liable than
to find against a skater who was probably uninsured. In both cases,
however, the court relied on an assumption of risk analysis. In Steen-
berg, a collision with a skater moving backwards was found to be in-
herent in the sport, whereas in Schamel, a collision with a reckless
violator of the rules, left uncontrolled by management, was not. The
effect that safety rule violations have on the assumption of risk defense
63. Id. at 450, 147 N.W.2d at 589 (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 451, 147 N.W.2d at 589.
65. 324 S.W.2d 375 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
66. Id. at 378.
67. She assumed risks that were inherent in the sport or amusement in which she was
engaged, such as falls and collisions with other skaters brought about by her own or
other skater[s] lack of skill or clumsiness. Such things are not extraordinary occurrences
in skating rinks. But she did not assume any extraordinary risks caused by the obvious
misconduct of other patrons which could have been detected and controlled by the de-
fendant.
Id. (citation omitted). The offending skater had violated the rink rules by skating too fast and
weaving in and out among the other skaters.
Another case rejecting the assumption of risk defense is Hawayek v. Simmons, 91 So. 2d 49
(La. App. 1956), in which the plaintiff fisherman was injured by a lure cast by his companion. The
court, though noting that a participant in a sport "assumes all risks incidental. . . and foresee-
able," id. at 53, held that the plaintiff had not assumed "all risks of negligence of those other
persons in the fishing party." Id. at 54. Since the miscast lure was not inherent to the sport, it was
not a risk assumed by the plaintiff.
Cases in which the risk has been held to have been assumed, and recovery barred, include
Tavernier v. Maes, 242 Cal. App. 2d 532, 51 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1966) (a second baseman's ankle was
broken by a hard slide); Richmond v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 298 So. 2d 118 (La. App.) (a
college baseball player was hit by a bat which slipped out of the hands of an assistant coach), cert.
denied, 302 So. 2d 18 (La. 1974); Gaspard v. Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co., 131 So. 2d 831 (La.
App. 1961) (the plaintiff was struck by a bat which slipped from the defendant's hands during
school recess); McGee v. Board of Educ., 16 A.D.2d 99, 226 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1962) (a teacher was hit
by a ball thrown from first to third base while he was instructing a pitcher on the pitcher's
mound).
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will be discussed below, 68 but it is important to note here the funda-
mental point that "assumption of risk" does not mean assumption of all
risks. Negligent activity outside the scope of assumed risk is undoubt-
edly actionable.69 That the plaintiff must have assumed the specific
risk that led to his injury in order to be barred from recovery reduces
the utility of the defense and makes it correspondingly easier for a
plaintiff to recover.
C. The Modern Trend.
In recent years, assumption of risk has been less effective as a de-
fense in sports injury cases. An important case demonstrating this de-
cline is Nabozny v. Barnhill.7° The plaintiff in Nabozny, a minor,
received serious injuries while playing goalkeeper in a soccer match.
He was kicked in the head by an opponent who, in violation of the
game's rules, pursued the ball after the plaintiff had picked it up.
Speaking wholly in terms of duty of care, the Nabozny court framed
the issue in the case as "whether the interest of the plaintiff which has
suffered invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the
defendant. 71
The court rejected the defendant's theory that a participant as-
sumes the risk of any injury he might receive during the course of a
game. Reversing a lower court's directed verdict for the defendant, 72
the court emphasized the defendant's violation of a known safety rule73
and concluded that deliberate or reckless disregard for rules proscrib-
ing certain conduct cannot be accepted as part of the game. The Na-
bozny court's reasoning-that participants in games do not assume the
risk that safety rules will be violated-is, at first blush, easily incorpo-
68. See notes 73-76 infra and accompanying text.
69. One New York court summed up this point well by noting:
Generally, the participants in an athletic event are held to have assumed the risks of
injury normally associated with the sport. . . .Players, coaches, managers, referees and
others who, in one way or another, voluntarily participate must accept the risks to which,
their roles expose them. Of course, this is not to say that actionable negligence can never
be committed on a playing field . . . . [A] participant's conduct may amount to such
careless disregard for the safety of others as to create risks not fairly assumed.
McGee v. Board of Educ., 16 A.D.2d at 101-02, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 331-32. This is a far more sophis-
ticated view of assumption of risk than was present in the earlier cases in this area.
70. 31 111. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975).
71. Id. at 214, 334 N.E.2d at 260 (citing W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 206).
72. 31 111. App. 3d at 216, 334 N.E.2d at 261. The court held that "It is our opinion that a
player is liable for injury in a tort action if his conduct is such that it is either deliberate, wilful or
with a reckless disregard for the safety of the other player. ... Id. at 215, 334 N.E.2d at 261.
73. In soccer, a player may not make contact with a goalkeeper who is within the penalty
area. Id. at 215, 334 N.E.2d at 260-61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50, comment b
(1965).
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rated into an assumption of risk approach. Essentially, this is the ap-
proach taken in comment b to section 50 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. Comment b, discussed by the Nabozny court,74 states that viola-
tions of safety rules are actionable even if such violations are frequent
and foreseeable.75 The traditional assumption of risk doctrine, how-
ever, precludes recovery for injuries resulting from foreseeable viola-
tions.76 Thus the Nabozny court, in adopting section 50, rejected the
traditional assumption of risk doctrine as being too harsh on the plain-
tiff.
7 7
In Bourque v. Duplechin, too, the court rejected the traditional as-
sumption of risk doctrine and held that
[a] participant in a game or sport assumes all of the risks incidental to
that particular activity which are obvious and foreseeable. A partici-
pant does not assume the risk of injury from fellow players acting in
an unexpected or unsportsmanlike way with a reckless lack of con-
cern for others participating.78
Although the Bourque holding is grounded on assumption of risk prin-
ciples, the court reduced considerably the area of obvious and foresee-
able risks. In Bourque, a 1977 case, a collision five feet from second
base in a competitive baseball game was held not to be a foreseeable
risk. Ten years earlier, however, a California court had held that a
hard slide into second base in a family game was foreseeable even if
players seldom slid.79 The trend is clear.80 Bourque reduced the area
74. 31 111. App. 3d at 215, 334 N.E.2d at 260-61.
75. The comment states:
Taking part in a game manifests a willingness to submit to such bodily contacts or
restrictions of liberty as are permitted by its rules or usages. Participating in such a game
does not manifest consent to contacts which are prohibited by rules or usages of the
game if such rules or usages are designed to protect the participants and not merely to
secure the better playing of the game as a test of skill. This is true although the player
knows that those with or against whom he is playing are habitual violators of such rules.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50, comment b (1965).
76. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
77. The rejection of the assumption of risk defense is by no means limited to sports litigation.
Several states have abolished the doctrine outright. See, e.g., Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586
(Ky. 1967); FeIgner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d 136 (1965) (with some exceptions);
Bolduc v. Crain, 104 N.H. 163, 181 A.2d 641 (1962); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc.,
31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959) (first jurisdiction to abolish the defense as a separate doctrine).
78. 331 So. 2d 40, 42 (La. App. 1976). The plaintiff in Bourque was a second baseman in a
competitive baseball game and the defendant was a baserunner. A collision occurred when the
plaintiff was over five feet from the base and had already released the ball. The court did not
require the defendant to be guilty of reckless misconduct before it would hold him liable. Rather,
ordinary negligence was sufficient for liability to attach. See id. at 43. Contra, Nabozny v. Barn-
hill, 31 111. App. 3d at 215, 334 N.E.2d at 261. Assumption of risk is a defense against both
negligence and reckless misconduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 503 (1965).
79. Tavernier v. Maes, 242 Cal. App. 2d 532, 51 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1966).
80. See Ceplina v. South Milwaukee School Bd., 73 Wis. 338, 243 N.W.2d 183 (1976), in
which a batter's swing struck the plaintiff, next in line to bat, in the face. Assumption of risk did
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of foreseeability of risks, with a concomitant increase in defendants'
liability. Nabozny went even further in implying that injuries stem-
ming from violations of safety rules are actionable, even if the violation
was foreseeable. 8'
In summary, the defense of assumption of risk, a traditional bar to
personal injury claims by participants in games and sports, is under
attack. The doctrine never fully escaped its confused and murky ori-
gins and is being phased out as a weapon in the defendant's arsenal.
Although the debate over its usefulness will no doubt continue, the de-
fense is, at least in sports-related personal injury actions, clearly in re-
treat.
Rudy Tomjanovich, in his suit against the Los Angeles Lakers,
was the first professional athlete to benefit from this retreat. 82 Al-
though Tomjanovich is a landmark decision in the area of professional
sports, the case is actually the next logical step in the history of per-
sonal injury actions in athletics. In Tomjanovich, the blow by Los An-
geles Laker Kermit Washington was both violative of league rules and
beyond the foreseeable contacts of the game. Regardless of how as-
sumption of risk is defined, the defense could not prevent Tomjanovich
from recovering. Basketball is a contact sport, but it is not so violent
that players can expect to incur injuries of either the nature or degree of
those Tomjanovich received. The blow did not arise out of the normal
pushing and shoving inherent in the game; if it had, the case would
have been more difficult. If the issue in Tomjanovich is simply whether
a safety rule was broken, liability is clear. If the issue is whether the
risk was foreseeable, liability is still clear.
In Hackbart, however, which also involved a personal injury ac-
tion by a professional athlete, the liability is less clear. Despite the as-
sault on assumption of risk evidenced by Nabozny and Bourque, the
district court in Hackbart defended that doctrine. 83 Implicitly, the
court rejected section 50, comment b, of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which negates the assumption of risk defense if the defendant
has violated a safety rule.84 Although the defendant in Hackbart
clearly violated a National Football League safety rule,85 the court paid
not, as a matter of law, bar the action. But see Richmond v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 298 So. 2d
118 (La. App.), cert. denied, 302 So. 2d 18 (La. 1974); Gaspard v. Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co.,
131 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 1961).
81. See notes 72-77 supra and accompanying text.
82. Bourque and Nabozny involved competitive but non-professional athletic contests.
83. 435 F. Supp. 352, 356 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 931 (1979).
84. Comment b is quoted at note 75 supra.
85. "All players are prohibited from striking on the head, face or neck with the heel, back or
side of the hand, wrist, forearm, elbow or clasped hands." Official Rules of Professional Football,
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little attention to this fact, focusing instead on whether the blow deliv-
ered by the defendant "[could] be considered as 'part of the game.' "86
In so doing, the court used an approach similar to that in Bourque,8 7
but arrived at a different result. Despite evidence to the contrary,88 the
court held that Clark's blow was "part of the game," and hence an
assumed risk. It paid particular attention to the violent and emotional
nature of the game, and to evidence that the blow, when viewed on
game films, did not bother team management. 89 The district court
erred, however, in its analysis. A plaintiff must assume the particular
risk that resulted in his injury for his claim to be barred.90 Discussions
about the violent nature9' of the game miss the point. The single ques-
Rule 12, § 2, art. 1, sec. 1, subsection C, quotedin Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d
516, 521 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979).
86. 435 F. Supp. at 356. The phrase "part of the game" is used in Note, Consent in Criminal
Law: Violence in Sports, 75 MICH. L. REv. 148, 160 (1976), and is defined as the ideals of the
game, plus any contact associated with those ideals. Id. The extent to which violence is tolerated
is relevant. The Note dealt principally with violence in hockey.
This view is similar to that taken in Note, Violence in Professional Sports, 1975 Wis. L. Rcv.
771, 787, which also deals primarily with hockey. While there have been no civil actions arising
from that sport, there have been three criminal cases. The state of Minnesota brought the only
American case, against Boston Bruin Dave Forbes. A hung jury resulted in a mistrial, and
charges were dropped. See also Regina v. Maki, 10 C.R.N.S. 268 (Ont. Prov. Ct. 1970); Regina v.
Green, 16 D.L.R.3d 137 (Ont. Prov. Ct. 1970). Both defendants in the Canadian cases were ac-
quitted. In Note, Violence in Professional Sports, supra, the author takes the position that rough-
ing, minor fighting, and highsticking, are "part of the game" of hockey, but that incidents such as
the Forbes case, in which a player smashed an opponent's face with his stick and then pummeled
him, are not. Only the latter situation should lead to civil and criminal charges. "In short, as
conduct becomes more brutal, it resembles less the sport than something all persons are equally
well-suited to judge." Id. 785.
87. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
88. See note 15 supra.
89. 435 F. Supp. at 356. The court stressed the "frequency of emotional outbursts" in the
league, a result of the emotional pitch at which the game is played. Id. John Ralston, the Denver
Broncos' head coach in 1973, testified that he seeks to instill in his players an emotional level
equivalent to that of a father who meets the man who attempted to kill his family. Id. at 355.
90. See text accompanying notes 61-69 supra.
91. Statistics reveal how violent the game really is. "In a recent two-year period [1973-74
season], the 1040 players who started the NFL season-plus their replacements-suffered an aver-
age of 1101 injuries so severe that they had to be removed from the contest. One hundred and
thirty-six underwent surgery." Hechter, The Criminal Law and Violence in Sports, 19 CRIM. L.Q.
425, 436-37 (1976-77). In his article, Hechter quotes from his interviews with professional football
players. Dwight White, a Pittsburgh Steeler defensive end, said, "[If] you play the game you
assume certain liabilities . . . .[Y]ou might get hurt or might get lamed or your neck broken
.... All that is part of the game." Id. 438. Whites comments, however, undoubtedly refer to
the injuries resulting from the actual playing of the game, and not to the type of blow Clark
delivered, away from the scene of the action. Hechter's article provides an interesting view of
sports violence and the role of the judicial system.
For a critical view of the violence in professional football see Booth, Clark Booth at the Suffer
Bowl, Death and Football, The Real Paper, Jan. 28, 1976, at 16, col. 4.
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tion to be answered is whether Hackbart assumed the risk of being hit
from behind when the play had already passed him by. This blow was
not one of the frequent and hence foreseeable violations of the rules
that should bar a plaintiff from recovering. Rather, it was, as the court
of appeals intimated,92 a reckless act of violence not assumed by a
player. Reversing the district court was good sense. It was also good
law, following recent precedent and the decline of the assumption of
risk defense. The actual ground for reversal was the district court's
holding that it lacked jurisdiction over the case. The Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari on this issue93 left intact the Tenth Circuit's ruling
that there was jurisdiction.94 The more interesting question concerns
the liability of professional athletes for game-related injuries.95 On the
92. The court stated:
But it is highly questionable whether a professional football player consents or submits
to injuries caused by conduct not within the rules, and there is no evidence which we
have seen which shows this ...
The general customs of football do not approve the intentional punching or striking of
others. That this is prohibited was supported by the testimony of all of the wit-
nesses. . . . [O]ne football player cannot intentionally inflict a serious injury on an-
other. Therefore, the notion is not correct that all reason has been abandoned, whereby
the only possible remedy for the person who has been the victim of an unlawful blow is
retaliation.
601 F.2d at 520-21.
93. 441 U.S. 931 (1979). See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976), which allows the Supreme Court to
hear cases from a circuit court on a writ of certiorari prior to the rendition of a final judgment, at
the Court's discretion.
94. The circuit court's analysis of the jurisdictional issue is very interesting. The court's use
of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), is too strict an application of the law
established in that case. The Hackbart court of appeals claimed Erie prohibited federal courts
from ever using public policy, absent approval by state law, as a basis for a decision. 601 F.2d at
523. Therefore, the district court should not have invoked social policy as a basis for its decision.
Id. When a case is of first impression, however, or when state law is unclear, a federal district
court is not precluded by Erie from making a ruling consistent with principles the court chooses to
adopt. The circuit court's use of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), also seems inappropriate. In
Flast, a taxpayer was given standing to enjoin the United States from spending federal funds to
buy books for religious schools. The Hackbart court relied on Flast as support for the proposition
that Hackbart should not be denied access to the federal forum, but Flast concerned constitutional
rights and has been limited to its facts. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1973); Laird v. Tatum 408 U.S. I
(1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
It is true, however, that the Hackbart district court's exposition on social policies overlooked
the right of an injured party to have access to the courts. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 6. Thus,
while the appellate court's use of Flast and Erie was not particularly appropriate, its reversal of
the district court was correct.
95. The court of appeals in Hackbart required that the action be brought for reckless miscon-
duct, rather than for ordinary negligence. 601 F.2d at 524. Reckless misconduct "actually in-
volves a risk substantially greater in magnitude than is necessary in the case of negligence." Id
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). Knowledge of the greater risk distinguishes
negligence from reckless misconduct. Id. Lack of intent to cause the specific injury distinguishes
reckless misconduct from intentional torts. Id. § 501, comment f. Colorado has adopted section
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facts in Hackbart, however, this issue can be decided without great dif-
ficulty. The risk of Clark's blow, like that of Washington's in the
Tomjanovich case, could not have been assumed. It was neither fore-
seeable nor "part of the game."
The inapplicability of the defense of assumption of risk in these
cases does not resolve the broad question of how far courts should go in
assessing liability against professional athletes. From an assumption of
risk perspective the issue is whether the standard of the defense should
be foreseeability, "part of the game," or section 50 of the Restatement.
The section 50 standard-that all safety rule violations are actiona-
ble-must be rejected as too liberal in its treatment of plaintiffs. Fore-
seeable violations of game rules should not be actionable by a
professional athlete. Although section 50 offers an easy determination
of liability by setting up a bright line category of actionable torts, the
test is too burdensome on defendant athletes. The best view inquires
whether the risk is a "part of the game." This standard differs from the
foreseeability test by avoiding the definitional problems inherent in the
wordforeseeabilit
, that have long haunted the law of torts. 96 The "part
of the game" standard would allow a plaintiff to recover even if his
injury resulted from a foreseeable risk, as long as that risk was not one
normally associated with the game. Thus, while Hackbart may have
foreseen the blow he received, given the emotionalism of the game and
the frustration of a losing player, the blow was not a "part of the
game." The Hackbart district court was wise in adopting the "part of
the game" standard, although it failed to apply that standard prop-
erly.97
The blows received by Hackbart and Tomjanovich were not "part
of the game[s]" played by those plaintiffs, and each defendant clearly
violated the rules of the respective sports. The blows resulted from ex-
traordinary behavior on the part of the defendants and not from con-
tact normal to the competition. Neither plaintiff assumed the risk of
such a blow, and each had a valid cause of action. But against whom
should these actions be brought? Is the individual player liable for his
conduct? Is his employer liable as well? In light of the analysis above,
the issue of employer liability poses particular difficulty. This is the
issue that the next section of this Comment will address.
500. See, e.g., Steeves v. Smiley, 144 Colo. 5, 354 P.2d 1011 (1960); Coffman v. Godsoe, 142 Colo.
575, 351 P.2d 808 (1960); Pettingell v. Moode, 129 Colo. 494, 271 P.2d 1038 (1954); Fanstiel v.
Wright, 122 Colo. 451, 222 P.2d 1001 (1950).
96. See text accompanying notes 113-20 infra.
97. See note 15 supra.
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III. "SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT" AND SPORTS LITIGATION:
THE LIABILITY OF A TEAM FOR THE RECKLESS
CONDUCT OF ITS PLAYERS
If the conduct of a player is found to be actionable, the question
arises whether his employer should be held accountable. Under the
principle of vicarious liability,98 an employer is liable for the wrongs
committed by an employee, if they were committed in the scope of em-
ployment.99 What constitutes the scope of employment, and indeed,
whether the phrase still represents the state of the law in employer-
employee vicarious liability, is the center of much controversy. This
section will focus upon the limited question of a team's liability for the
reckless conduct of a player, addressing the scope of employment prob-
lem to determine what actions taken by a player are within that scope.
The only litigated professional sports case in the civil damages
area is Tomjanovich, which, although decided by a federal court in
Houston, involved California law. 00 The unusual position taken by
California courts concerning vicarious liability is unhelpful in a broad
analysis of employer liability for injuries inflicted by an employee-
game participant. In Carr v. Wm. C Crowell Co.,101 the California
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Traynor, held that "if the in-
jury resulted from a dispute arising out of the employment"' 0 2 and if
the employment required the employee to associate with third parties
who precipitated the injury,' 03 the employer was liable. In adopting an
"arising out of" standard, the court rejected "scope of employment" as
the benchmark of liability.I04 In California, an employer is responsible
for third parties' injuries caused by an employee if the employee's ac-
tions in any way arise out of his job. Although Carr remains the law of
California, no other state has adopted such a broad scope of liability
for an employer.'0 5
98. For discussions of vicarious liability, see generally F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 43,
ch. XXVI, §§ 26.6-.8; W. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 70.
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958). But see Fields v. Sanders, 29
Cal. 2d 834, 180 P.2d 684 (1947); Carr v. Win. C. CroweU Co., 28 Cal. 2d 652, 171 P.2d 5 (1946).
100. See Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc., No. 78-243 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 1979), appeal
docketed, No. 79-3889 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 1979).
101. 28 Cal. 2d 652, 171 P.2d 5 (1946). Carr involved a fight between employees of two build-
ing contractors. The fight stemmed from an argument regarding the quality of work being per-
formed and resulted in a head injury to the plaintiff from a hammer thrown by the defendant's
employee.
102. Id. at 654, 171 P.2d at 7 (emphasis added). See CAL. CIv. CODE § 2338 (West 1954).
103. 28 Cal. 2d at 656, 171 P.2d at 7. On the facts of the case, the enunciated rule clearly led to
the finding that the employer was liable to the injured third party.
104. Id.
105. Note, Respondeat Superior and the Intentional Tort: A Short Discourse on How to Make
Assault and Battery a Part ofthe Job, 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 235, 248 (1976). The Court of Appeals
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Given this unusually expansive rule of vicarious liability, it is not
surprising that in Tomjanovich the Los Angeles Lakers were held liable
for the blow delivered by employee Kermit Washington. The injury to
Tomjanovich clearly resulted from a dispute arising out of Washing-
ton's employment, and was not the result of a purely personal griev-
ance unrelated to basketball. Under California law this is sufficient to
hold the employer liable. The case was therefore not analyzed from a
"scope of employment" perspective. "Scope of employment" does,
however, remain the standard by which employer liability is deter-
mined in the other forty-nine states. Thus, the imposition of liability
on the Lakers in Tomjanovich is relatively unhelpful in dealing with the
issue of vicarious liability more generally.
The majority position regarding vicarious liability is illustrated by
the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in Milazzo v. Kansas City
Gas Co. 106 The dispute in Milazzo, as in Carr, "arose out of" the em-
ployment of the defendant's employee.'0 7 Unlike the employer-de-
fendant in Carr, however, the employer in Milazzo was not held
liable.'0 8 The majority rule, under which Milazzo was decided, is that
unless the employee is in some way furthering the interests of the em-
ployer, he is not acting within the scope of his employment. Therefore,
when the employee acts out of wholly personal motives, the employer is
not liable. 109
The Restatement (Second) ofAgency repeatedly emphasizes the re-
quirement that the employee be acting to further in some way the inter-
ests of the employer in order for the latter to be held liable. "10 Outside
of California, this is still the prevailing view."' When the majority
for the Second Circuit, when using federal common law, has adopted a standard similar to Cali-
fornia's. Id. See notes 116-18 infra and accompanying text.
106. 180 S.W.2d I (Mo. 1944). A meter reader assaulted a customer of the defendant gas
company while reading the meter. The opinion does not clearly describe the details of the skir-
mish, but the dispute did, without doubt, arise out of the meter reader's employment. The plaintiff
had questioned the defendant's employee about the accuracy of his readings, and the validity of
the gas bills. The altercation arose from these questions.
107. See text accompanying notes 101-03 supra.
108. 180 S.W.2d at 7.
109. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228-229, 235, 245 (1958). Illustrative cases
are cited in note Ill infra.
110. Section 228 of the RESTATEMENT provides that an act is within the scope of employment
only if "it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958). See also id. §§ 236, 245, comment f.
I11. See, e.g., Pickering v. Daniel J. Keating Co., 460 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1972); Oman v.
United States, 179 F.2d 738, 741 (10th Cir. 1949); Avery v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937, 942
(D. Conn. 1977); Cruikshank v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1355, 1358 (D. Hawaii 1977); Vargas
v. Correa, 416 F. Supp. 266, 272-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Wright v. Globe Porcelain Co., 72 N.J.
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view is applied to the facts of the Hackbart case it may produce a result
different from that in Tomjanovich. In Hackbart the court found that
Clark inflicted the blow "out of anger and frustration."" 2 It is difficult
to see how this blow can be said to have been delivered to further the
interests of the employer. Clark did not intentionally injure an impor-
tant player to help win a game. Rather, the blow by Clark arose out of
a purely personal motive-the venting of anger. For such conduct the
employer should not be liable.
Those who argue that conduct such as Clark's or Washington's" 13
ought to be attributable to the team because of the emotionalism that
coaches instill in the players, 14 may fall into a classic catch-22. If the
conduct of the reckless defendant is a direct consequence of the em-
ployer's actions, the employer is liable. But such conduct, if it inheres
in the competition, should also be foreseen by the injured plaintiff. As-
suming for the moment that foreseeability is the standard by which to
measure assumption of risk,"15 those actions foreseen by the team are
also those foreseen by the plaintiff and accordingly assumed by him.
Thus, conduct for which the team could be liable under agency law is
conduct exempt from liability under the assumption of risk defense.
This is true unless two different definitions of foreseeability are used.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit advocated such an ap-
proach in Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States."16 In holding the
United States liable for the tortious conduct of a seaman, the Bushey
court adopted a foreseeability test'' 7 for vicarious liability, but distin-
guished that test from the foreseeability standard used to determine
negligence. The court quoted a leading treatise to support its holding
that "what is reasonably foreseeable in this context [respondeat supe-
rior] . . . is quite a different thing from the foreseeably unreasonable
risk of harm that spells negligence." '" 8 The result in Bushey is similar
Super. 414, 418, 179 A.2d 11, 13 (App. Div. 1962). Contra, Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States,
398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
112. 435 F. Supp. at 353.
113. For purposes of this discussion it is assumed that California law would not supply the
basis for the decision in Tomjanovich.
114. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
115. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
116. 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968). A drunken seaman returning to his ship flooded Bushey's
dry dock, partially sinking the dock and the ship. Bushey sued the United States for damages.
117. Id. at 171.
118. Id. (quoting F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 43, at 1372). The treatise continues:
Further, we are not looking for that which can and should reasonably be avoided, but
with the more or less inevitable toll of a lawful enterprise. The foresight that should
impel the prudent man to take precautions is not the same measure as that by which he
should perceive the harm likely to flow from his long-run activity ....
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 43, at 1377.
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to the result of the California vicarious liability cases. 1 9 In California
an employee's tortious conduct, if it arises out of his employment, is
sufficient to hold an employer liable. Under the Bushey court's analy-
sis, such tortious conduct would also be sufficient to hold the employer
liable since the conduct is a foreseeable business event. How these var-
ious definitions of foreseeability differ when used in the different con-
texts of negligence, vicarious liability, and assumption of risk is a
difficult question. It is also the reason this Comment chooses to forego
use of the foreseeability standard in assumption of risk.120
A court that holds a team liable for an injury to a participant ath-
lete would reason as follows: The plaintiff has not assumed the risk
arising out of the particular conduct, since the act was unforeseeable.
The defendant team is liable, however, because its player's act was "an
inevitable toll"'' of business and, hence, was foreseeable. Under this
model the team is held to have foreseen the act, and to have prepared
to handle it as a business expense. The plaintiff-player, however, has
not foreseen the same act, since it is a complete departure from the
rules, customs, and normal violations of the game. A court must, then,
give twisted definitions to the word foreseeability to allow a cause of
action to be brought by a player against an opposing team. If the possi-
bility that the reckless misconduct of an employee will injure an oppo-
nent is an "inevitable toll" of business, it is incongruous to say at the
same time that the athlete does not assume the risk of injury. To do so
requires a court to deprive foreseeability of any consistent core mean-
ing at all and to bend the word to achieve the desired result in each
context. So variable a definition obfuscates the law, and places too
great a burden-that of an insurer--on an employer.t 22 Although this
approach avoids the catch-22 discussed above, 2 3 the better solution is
to hold the participant-defendant, but not the team, liable. If the par-
ticipant-plaintiff can bring an action, the act of the opponent is by defi-
nition, in this model, not foreseeable. The act, therefore, should not be
"an inevitable toll" of business, and the team should not be held liable.
In essence, the type of action that could result in employer liability
should, at the same time, bar the plaintiff's action altogether, because it
must have been foreseen.
As demonstrated in Part II, the "part of the game" standard is
more appropriate than the foreseeability standard for the assumption
119. See notes 101-05 supra and accompanying text.
120. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra & 124-27 infra.
121. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 43, at 1377.
122. The Bushey court acknowledged this in noting that "the fact that the defendant is better
able to afford damages is not alone sufficient to justify legal responsibility." 398 F.2d at 171.
123. See text accompanying notes 114-15 supra.
[Vol, 1980:742
A THLETIC INJURIES
of risk defense in sports injury cases. The blows to the plaintiffs in both
Hackbart and Tomjanovich certainly do not satisfy the "part of the
game" standard, 24 which is defined as the ideals of the game plus all
contact associated with those ideals.125 It is a narrower standard of as-
sumption of risk than foreseeability and permits recovery for acts that
are not "part of the game,"'126 even when those acts are foreseeable.
Accordingly, a team could properly be held liable under a Bushey-Cali-
fornia vicarious liability standard and a "part of the game" assumption
of risk standard for certain foreseeable injuries without the court's get-
ting mired in the definitional problems inherent under a foreseeability
standard of assumption of risk.127 As the Tomjanovich decision indi-
cates, if an act is not a part of the game and is therefore actionable, the
employer is liable as long as the act is not the result of "personal mal-
ice, not engendered by the employment." 28 Since no personal malice
was involved in Tomjanovich, the Lakers were correctly held liable.
Thus, under the minority view of California and Bushey (in which neg-
ligence foreseeability differs from assumption of risk foreseeability), if
the "part of the game" standard of assumption of risk is used, a player
may properly sue an opposing team without the use of conflicting defi-
nitions of foreseeability.
The majority view, under which the scope of employment test is
the standard of vicarious liability, operates differently. It provides that
when an employee acts for purely personal reasons and not to further
the interests of the employer, his actions are not within the requisite
scope even if they arise out of the employment. 29 Two modem exam-
ples are Vargas v. Correa3 ° and Cruikshank v. United States.'3' In
Vargas, the court held that although a prison guard occupies a position
in which the use of force can be expected, the employer is not liable
when the actionable tort grows out of a dispute not directly related to
the job. The court noted that any other decision would reduce the doc-
124. See text accompanying notes 95-97 supra.
125. See note 86 supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
127. See text accompanying notes 121-22 supra.
128. Carr v. Wm. C. Crowell Co., 28 Cal. 2d 652, 656, 171 P.2d 5, 8 (1946).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228-229 (1958). See note 110 supra.
130. 416 F. Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Plaintiff, a prisoner, sued a prison guard for injuries
resulting from a fight. The altercation occurred when the guard changed the channel on a televi-
sion installed for the inmates. The prisoners protested and the fight between the litigants ensued.
131. 431 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Hawaii 1977). The Central Intelligence Agency had opened Cruik-
shank's correspondences to the Soviet Union and had monitored the mail of many people without
judicial authority. For a case with facts and a holding similar to Cruikshank, see Avery v. United
States, 434 F. Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1977). Vargas, Cruikshank, and Avery all dealt with inten-
tional torts.
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trine of respondeat superior to nothing more than a tool to hold the
employer liable at all times.132 Similarly, in Cruikshank the court held
that the employer is liable only "if the employee was motivated by a
desire to help his employer. . . .,,33 These cases are in accord with,
and follow the reasoning of, Nilazzo134 in holding that actions by the
employee, if not motivated by a purpose to serve the employer, cannot
result in employer liability.'35 Comment f to section 245 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency also takes this position.136
Thus, under the majority rule, the Cincinnati Bengals in Hack-
bart, as Clark's employer, should not be held liable for the torts of its
employee. The Bengals are more likely to be insured, and are probably
better able than Clark to afford the loss, but neither reason is sufficient
to justify liability on the facts in Hackbart. Under the clear weight of
authority, personal actions of an employee that do not further the inter-
ests of the employer are not attributable to the employer; hence, the
Bengals and other similarly situated teams in the future must be held
not liable.
IV. CONCLUSION
Merging the troublesome areas of assumption of risk and vicarious
liability in personal injury actions in professional sports, an area previ-
132. 416 F. Supp. at 271-72.
133. 431 F. Supp. at 1358. The court added that the employer would also be liable "if it [were]
fair to shift the loss from the victim to the employer." Id. However, this last part of the quotation
does not deserve much credence. Employer liability would essentially be absolute, because it is
generally easier for an insured employer to bear the loss than a victim. Furthermore, the Cru/k-
shank court cites Bushey, but even Bushey does not make the employer an insurer. See note 122
supra and accompanying text. The significance of Cruikshank is that it supports the proposition
that actions not undertaken to further the interests of the employer are the acts of the employee
alone and do not give rise to employer liability. For a case that fully comports with this statement
of the law, see Avery v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937, 942 (D. Conn. 1977).
134. See notes 106-09 supra and accompanying text.
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958), which is in accord. See also note
110 supra.
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 245 (1958) provides:
Use of Force.
A master is subject to liability for the intended tortious harm by a servant to the person
or things of another by an act done in connection with the servant's employment, al-
though the act was unauthorized, if the act was not unexpectable in view of the duties of
the servant.
This position is then limited by comment f of that section:
Servant actuatedbypersonalmotives. The liability of a master for the use of force by
a servant is not prevented by the fact that the servant acts in part because of a personal
motive, such as revenge. The master, however, is relieved from liability under the rule
stated in this Section if the servant has no intent to act on his master's behalf, although
the events from which the tortious act follows arise while the servant is acting in the
employment and the servant becomes angry because of them. The fact that the servant
acts in an outrageous manner or inflicts a punishment out of all proportion to the neces-
sities of his master's business is evidence indicating that the servant has departed from
the scope of employment in performing the act.
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ously untouched by courts, caused certain difficulties. 137 A separate
treatment of assumption of risk led to the conclusion that neither
Hackbart nor Tomjanovich should be prevented from bringing a per-
sonal injury action by an assumption of risk defense. A separate treat-
ment of vicarious liability concluded that the Cincinnati Bengals in
Hackbart should not be held liable for Clark's conduct. These issues,
however, cannot be viewed separately in a lawsuit. They are inter-
twined and must be treated as such. Thus, court findings on the plain-
tiff's assumption of risk weigh heavily in determining whether the
employer is liable. To choose a "foreseeability" standard in assump-
tion of risk is to invite confusion. The standard is too broad and should
result in the team never being liable for tortious player conduct. The
"part of the game" standard allows for a more straightforward analysis,
regardless of whether the Bushey-California or majority rule of vicari-
ous liability is used. Accordingly, the "part of the game" standard
should be adopted.
Courts need not refrain from entering the arena of sports litiga-
tion. They must, however, refrain from confusing the area by blurring
the issues involved. Proper standards can be applied to reach clear,
legally. correct decisions in this area. Professional sports litigation, al-
though a new branch of law, is not without roots. The troublesome
issues raised here can be handled as they have been handled in other
areas of the law, such as amateur sports and games. Subject to certain
restraints, to ensure that the game is played more on the field than in
the courtroom, courts must provide a remedy for reckless conduct,
whether it occurs on a field of play or elsewhere. Access to the courts
cannot be denied to injured players like Hackbart and Tomjanovich.
Players violating the "part of the game" standard should not be able to
hide behind the defense of assumption of risk. It does not follow, how-
ever, that a team should necessarily also be liable. In fact, under the
majority rule, a team should not be held liable for actions like those of
"Booby" Clark and Kermit Washington. The players themselves
should be personally liable. Athletes today have pockets sufficiently
deep to handle liability for their actions. If they do not, perhaps fear of
financial loss will induce them to circumscribe their conduct. Certainly
no sport will suffer if judicial involvement prevents future conduct like
that of Washington and Clark.
Neil . Tucker
137. This Comment is not concerned with the "justness" of the Bushe, decision and its expan-
sion of vicarious liability. Nor is its purpose to discuss the proper role of assumption of risk in tort
law. Rather, this Comment seeks to explore the new area of tort liability in professional athletics,
focusing on the issues most troublesome to this new field of law.
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